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Abstract 11 
Metacognition, the cognition about cognition, is closely linked to intelligence and 12 
therefore understanding the metacognitive processes underlying intelligence test 13 
performance, specifically on Raven’s Progressive Matrices, could help advance the 14 
knowledge about intelligence. The measurement of metacognition, is often done using 15 
domain-general offline questionnaires or domain-specific online think-aloud protocols. 16 
This study aimed to investigate the relationship between metacognitive awareness and 17 
intelligence via the design and use of a novel Meta-Cognitive Awareness Scale – 18 
Domain Specific (MCAS-DS) that encourages reflection of task strategy processes. 19 
This domain-specific scale was first constructed to measure participants’ awareness of 20 
their own metacognition linked to Raven’s Progressive Matrices (SPM). Following 21 
discriminatory index, Exploratory Factor Analysis, a 15-item scale was devised. 22 
Exploratory Factor Analysis showed five factors: Awareness of Engagement in Self-23 
Monitoring, Awareness of Own Ability, Awareness of Responding Speed/Time, 24 
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Awareness of Alternative Solutions and Awareness of Requisite Problem-Solving 25 
Resources. The intelligence level of ninety-eight adults was then estimated using 26 
Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices. Participants also completed the MCAS-DS, 27 
and further items that examined their test-taking behaviour and Confidence level. 28 
Metacognitive awareness was positively correlated to standardized IQ scores derived 29 
from the SPM whilst Over-Confidence derived using the Confidence level measure was 30 
negatively correlated to SPM. Despite some limitations, this study shows promise for 31 
elucidating the relationship between metacognitive awareness and intelligence using 32 
the task-specific scale. 33 
 34 
Introduction 35 
Intelligence is a higher order cognition associated with metacognition (Veenman and 36 
Beishuizen, 2004; Swanson, 1992). In Sternberg’s (1988) Triarchic Model of 37 
Intelligence, metacognitive processes form an integral part. Metacognition refers to the 38 
human ability to reflect upon our own perceptions, thoughts, and actions (Sternberg, 39 
2018; Valk et al., 2016); and is therefore, broadly defined as cognitions about 40 
cognitions, or thinking about one’s own thinking (Georghiades, 2004; Roberts and 41 
Erdos, 1993). Flavell (1976) described metacognition as “the active monitoring and 42 
consequent regulation and orchestration” of cognitive processes (p.232) and proposed 43 
that the two components of metacognition, knowledge and metacognitive experience, 44 
interact in monitoring and regulating cognitive processes (Flavell, 1988). 45 
Metacognitive monitoring and metacognitive control are processes related to 46 
information flow between two levels, the object- and meta-hierarchical levels, as 47 
discussed within a Metacognitive Model proposed by Nelson (1996). The object-level 48 
is a lower-level cognition, such as deriving a solution to a problem, which can itself be 49 
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the subject of a higher meta-level cognition such as thinking about whether all the 50 
information required to derive the solution is available (Nelson, 1996). This 2-level 51 
(object- and meta-hierarchical levels) system can be extended to a 3-level 52 
metacognitive system where the mid-level cognition can both receive monitored 53 
information from the lowest level and itself being subject to the highest third level 54 
cognition’s control (Narens et al., 1996).  There are other models proposed, including 55 
single, dual or hierarchical models which described the different way information- 56 
processing channels can lead toward task performance and subjective, confidence 57 
ratings, for example (Maniscalco and Lau, 2016). Others have proposed first-order, 58 
post-decisional and second-order models in an attempt to account for the relationship 59 
between self-evaluations of one’s own performance and their actual performance 60 
(Fleming and Daw, 2017). 61 
 62 
Research suggests that metacognition is strongly related to problem-solving (Lucangeli 63 
et al., 1997), comprehension (Veenman and Beishuizen, 2004), memory (Schwartz et 64 
al., 2004), and learning (Veenman and Spaans, 2005; Stankov and Kleitman, 2014); 65 
consequently, research addressing educational needs has sought to study learning and 66 
memory related metacognition for quite some time. Conversely, meta-reasoning, 67 
defined as the monitoring of processes relating to more complex cognitive tasks such 68 
as problem-solving, has received far less attention until recently (Ackerman and 69 
Thompson, 2017). This monitoring can entail the regulation of time and effort allotted 70 
to a task (Ackerman and Thompson, 2017). It has been argued that qualitative 71 
differences between individuals in the way they effectively problem-solve is more 72 
pertinent than how much they engage in problem-solving (Evans, 2007). It is therefore 73 
important to examine the way individuals engage in reasoning. A few key research 74 
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questions in meta-reasoning have been raised, including one that pertains to the current 75 
investigation, that being: “How do individuals differ in their ability to assess their 76 
performance?” (Ackerman and Thompson, 2017). Inherent in this question is the 77 
assumption that this partly relies on the individuals’ awareness of their own meta-78 
cognitive processes. Not only do individuals rely on cues such as perceived ease of 79 
responding in monitoring their own performance, there are differences in the efficacy 80 
of the cues. Therefore, some of this information can be misleading (Ackerman and 81 
Thompson, 2017). 82 
 83 
Whilst the relationship between metacognition and intelligence is not entirely clear 84 
(Stankov and Kleitman, 2014), empirical studies have shown a positive relationship 85 
between the two (Veenman and Beishuizen, 2004; Swanson, 1992; Veenman et al., 86 
2014), suggesting that metacognitive awareness processes may vary when performing 87 
cognitive tasks. Metacognitive awareness of cognitive processes are more apparent in 88 
individuals who excel in cognitive activities than those who perform less well 89 
(Livingston, 2003). This includes intellectually gifted children, who display higher 90 
metacognitive knowledge than children of high-average and low-average intelligence 91 
(Swanson, 1992). At the other end of the intellectual spectrum, individuals with an 92 
intellectual disability may struggle to generate cognitive strategies and generalise the 93 
use of learned strategies to solve reasoning tasks such as Raven’s Standard Progressive 94 
Matrices (SPM) items (Campione and Brown, 1978). In view of such research, it has 95 
been posited that highly intelligent individuals may have additional cognitive resources 96 
with which to engage the task at hand as well as managing metacognitive activity 97 
(Ohtani and Hisasaka, 2018). Although the suggestion that the availability and 98 
utilisation of extra cognitive resources by intelligent individuals remains speculative, it 99 
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is supported by brain-imaging studies that show differential patterns of neurological 100 
activity among individuals of different ability levels when undergoing Raven’s 101 
Progressive Matrices (Song, 2005). This conforms to the neural efficiency hypothesis 102 
(Dunst et al., 2014), and Parieto-Frontal Integration Theory (Jung and Haier, 2007). 103 
 104 
The relationship between metacognition and task performance varies according to the 105 
type of cognitive task being performed (van der Stel and Veenman, 2008). Raven’s 106 
Progressive Matrices has often been used as a measure of problem-solving ability, or g, 107 
general intelligence (Penrose and Raven, 1936), having been designed as a way to 108 
assess and measure eduction processes that Spearman emphasised as the fundamental 109 
nature of intelligence (Raven and Raven, 2003). A version of the task, the Standard 110 
Progressive Matrices (SPM), has been described as “one of the purest and best measures 111 
of g or general intellectual functioning available” (Raven and Raven, 2000). Although 112 
this has been contested, it is still often thought to measure the fluid intelligence branch 113 
within the Cattell-Horn-Carroll intelligence model (Gignac, 2015; Stankov, 2000; 114 
Waschl et al., 2016). Some have called it a “hallmark fluid intelligence test (Chuderski, 115 
Jastrzębski, Kroczek, Kucwaj and Ociepka, 2020).  116 
Rule induction and goal management are required to solve Raven’s Progressive 117 
Matrices (Loesche et al., 2015), and its utility for easily assessing cognitive ability has 118 
seen this reasoning task being used within several neuroimaging studies (Chen et al., 119 
2017; Duncan et al., 2017; Song, 2005). In order to study the processes underlying 120 
Raven’s Progressive Matrices, a recent study examined participants who were required 121 
to self-monitor, remember their cognitive operations and appraise their solution. 122 
Participants’ subjective experience were also measured as part of metacognition 123 
measurement.  The results showed that the metacognitive experiences may vary within 124 
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the set of matrices. The study demonstrated and argued that Raven’s Progressive 125 
Matrices is worthy of greater scrutiny due to its popularity as an intelligence test used 126 
in basic, educational and professional settings as well as the role it can play to advance 127 
the knowledge about human cognitive ability (Chuderski, Jastrzębski, Kroczek, Kucwaj 128 
and Ociepka, 2020). 129 
 130 
Therefore, given the close relationship between SPM and fluid intelligence, and the 131 
opportunity afforded by Raven’s Progressive Matrices in elucidating higher level 132 
cognitive processes, it is chosen as the focal task upon which metacognition, 133 
specifically, metacognitive awareness, will be measured in this study. 134 
 135 
Measures of metacognitive performance risk being affected by confounding variables 136 
such as the nature of task demands alongside broader measurement difficulties; indeed, 137 
a key challenge in this area of research continues to be the availability of reliable 138 
measures for metacognitive ability (Kelemen et al., 2000). There exists metacognitive 139 
measures such as the Metacognitive Awareness Inventory (Schraw and Dennison, 140 
1994). However, for reasons to be explained later, these are not suitable for the current 141 
investigation. Furthermore, there is the assertion that the type of metacognitive measure 142 
employed may moderate the metacognition-intelligence relationship (Ohtani and 143 
Hisasaka, 2018). Even the elicitation of participants’ responses to metacognition 144 
measures will alter the processes for which the measures were constructed (Double and 145 
Birney, 2019). Together, these make the accurate and valid measure of metacognition, 146 
an important issue for this field. 147 
 148 
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Existing measures do not always reflect the aspects of cognition involved in specific 149 
tasks such as intelligence tests. In other words, existing measures are too generic, 150 
instead of being specific which will measure individuals when they engage in 151 
metacognitive processes specific to a focal task. Some of the existing measures were 152 
constructed in order to apply them to a general learning context, and to specific 153 
populations such as children. This lack of specificity issue was raised by Allon et al. 154 
(1989), who in view of their own research yielding a non-significant result concerning 155 
the relationship between intelligence and metacognition, argued for the need for 156 
metacognitive measures to reflect the task demand of any corresponding intelligence 157 
test. A recent meta-analytic review continued to highlight the importance of considering 158 
the type of metacognition measurement used (Ohtani and Hisasaka, 2018). There are 159 
two main types of metacognitive measures, these being: online and offline measures. 160 
Online measures often use a think-aloud protocol, while offline measures commonly 161 
use retrospective questionnaires. Online measures are thought to assess metacognition 162 
during focal tasks, whilst offline measures assess domain-general metacognition 163 
(Ohtani and Hisasaka, 2018). Metacognitive Awareness Inventory is an example of 164 
such an offline measure. The former seems more accurate than the latter; however, the 165 
former, as online measures, can disrupt optimal task performance by eliciting reactivity 166 
in individuals by influencing strategy selection processes and exerts significantly higher 167 
mental effort than offline measures (Garner and Alexander, 1989; Zakay, 1996). 168 
Disruptions to performance can take place especially when the think-aloud protocol 169 
requires individuals to provide explanations about their thought processes rather than 170 
when they merely verbalise their thoughts during a task (Fox, Ericsson and Best, 2011). 171 
For a task such as the Raven’s Progressive Matrices, it may be difficult for individuals 172 
to be asked to selectively report only their thought processes, and not for them to 173 
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provide an explanation as to the steps they are taking to find the solutions. Therefore, 174 
the likelihood of disrupting their performance is high. In addition, thinking-aloud will 175 
increase the time taken to arrive at the solutions, and may alter the way individuals 176 
normally approaches the task. Thinking-aloud procedure has been found to interfere 177 
with performance on spatial tasks (Fox, Ericsson and Best, 2011). Raven’s Progressive 178 
Matrices can be considered a spatial task. 179 
 180 
Given that even a simple request for participants to provide self-confidence ratings in 181 
the accuracy of their own answers, which is considered one metacognition measure, 182 
could influence Raven’s Progressive Matrices performance (Double and Birney, 2017), 183 
the choice of measure is important. Therefore, the less impact the metacognition 184 
measure has on the task performance, the better it would be. 185 
 186 
Setting the current study within the context of the 3-level metacognitive system 187 
described earlier (Narens et al., 1996), individuals would therefore engage in problem-188 
solving (Object-level, L0). They would also utilise various strategies to enable them to 189 
problem-solve (Mid Meta-level, L1). Their awareness of the strategies they have used 190 
would be considered the highest level of cognition within this system (Highest Meta-191 
level, L2). In the current study, a new scale will be constructed and it is best seen as 192 
operating at the highest Meta-Level L2. It specifically measures individuals’ awareness 193 
of their own meta-reasoning processes. To our knowledge, there are no existing scales 194 
that have attempted to measure this L2 Meta-Level cognition. Hence, this is a unique 195 
contribution of this research to this area of study. 196 
 197 
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Regarding individual differences in metacognitive awareness: poor performers in tasks 198 
tend to overestimate their own performance relative to good performers—known as the 199 
Dunning-Kruger effect; indeed, evidence suggests that poor performers have poorer 200 
insight, or are less aware of their own thought processes, than good performers 201 
(McIntosh et al., 2019). Moreover, people who perform poorly during analytical tasks  202 
appear less aware of their tendency to rely on intuition rather than analytical judgement, 203 
whilst those who perform well during analytical tasks show an increased awareness of 204 
their reasoning strengths and weaknesses, thus facilitating metacognitive monitoring 205 
(Pennycook et al., 2017). However, the mechanism explaining the link between insight 206 
and inaccurate self-estimation is not yet clear (Fleming and Lau, 2014). Related to self-207 
assessment of performance and own confidence are other related concepts such as 208 
metacognition sensitivity, bias, and efficiency (Fleming and Lau, 2014). In terms of 209 
self-assessment, the current study will only examine the general idea of self-rated 210 
confidence in the accuracy of their own performance expressed as over-/under-211 
confidence. Given the importance of the accuracy of self-report, the response bias of 212 
participants cannot be underestimated (Fastame and Penna, 2012). Therefore, this study 213 
will also examine social desirability. 214 
 215 
Age differences have been reported in relation to Raven’s Progressive Matrices 216 
performance, in both sectional and longitudinal studies. Older adults often exhibit 217 
poorer performance on reasoning tasks than younger adults (Yuan et al., 2018). 218 
Education level is another demographic factor that has been found to relate to 219 
performance in reasoning tasks, including Raven’s Progressive Matrices (Pearman, 220 
2020). Therefore, both age and education will be included in this study. 221 
 222 
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This study has two aims: (1) to develop a novel questionnaire to assess the awareness 223 
of individuals’ own meta-reasoning when completing the Raven’s Standard Progressive 224 
Matrices (SPM); (2) to investigate the relationship between meta-reasoning and 225 
intelligence using the newly developed Meta-Cognitive Awareness Scale-Domain-226 
Specific, SPM standardised scores and variables such as Age, Education Level, Over-227 
/Under-confidence and Social Desirability. 228 
   229 
It was hypothesised that Meta-Cognitive Awareness Scale score would be positively 230 
correlated with standardized SPM scores. It was also hypothesised that Metacognitive 231 
Awareness, Age, Education level, and Over-/Under-Confidence would predict SPM 232 
scores. As such, the relationship between individual differences in factors such as 233 
metacognitive awareness, and ability as exhibited in their SPM performance could be 234 
explored. 235 
 236 
Materials and Methods 237 
Participants 238 
There were 100 participants however two participants were excluded due to the loss of 239 
most of their data. The remaining 98 participants consisted of 68 females and 30 males. 240 
Overall mean age was 33.1 (SD=16.5); age range: 18-79 years. Most participants (51%) 241 
had completed their high school education, and 59.32% of participants were students. 242 
Only 36.7% of participants claimed to have had previous experience with Raven’s 243 
Progressive Matrices or other similar tasks. 244 
 245 
Procedure 246 
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This study was approved by the Federation University Human Research Ethics 247 
Committee.  All participants provided written informed consent and administered the 248 
60-item SPM in paper-and-pen format using standardised instructions with no time 249 
limit. They then completed the Meta-Cognitive Awareness Scale – Domain Specific 250 
(MCAS-DS) and accompanying items exploring participants’ experiences immediately 251 
after they have completed the SPM to help them to more easily recall their experience 252 
and strategy and thus minimize recall failure. The Marlowe-Crown Social Desirability 253 
Scale was then administered. Some basic demographic information, including their 254 
highest education level were also obtained. For a smaller group of participants, they 255 
were also administered the Metacognitive Awareness Inventory (MAI) and Rotter’s 256 
Locus of Control scale. Unfortunately, there was a technical error during the data-257 
collection process whereby only a small subgroup of participants (n=16, 6 males and 258 
10 females) were administered the additional two scales. 259 
 260 
Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices (SPM)  261 
All 60 items of the SPM (Raven et al., 2000) were used. Each SPM item was presented 262 
as a puzzle in a matrix format, from which a piece had been removed. Either six or eight 263 
possible solution pieces, from which only one piece correctly completed the matrix, 264 
were offered. The SPM has good psychometric properties with test-retest reliability 265 
coefficients ranging from .83 to .93 and construct validity coefficients ranging from .81 266 
to .94 (Raven et al., 2000). Only correct items were tallied, and the scores transformed 267 
into standardized scores. 268 
 269 
Meta-Cognitive Awareness Scale – Domain Specific (MCAS-DS): Scale 270 
Development 271 
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Given the aim of this study is to examine meta-cognitive awareness when performing 272 
SPM, and no such domain-specific offline questionnaire exists, a scale which focuses 273 
on Raven’s Progressive Matrices was constructed. Although the structure of other 274 
metacognitive questionnaires such as the Metacognitive Awareness Inventory (MAI) 275 
were used as an initial reference, the phrasing of the items were distinctively different 276 
to those on other questionnaires such that this current scale refers specifically to 277 
Raven’s Progressive Matrices, and uses words like puzzles and matrix to focus attention 278 
on the task at hand, and not on other generic tasks. From the initial larger pool of items, 279 
40 items that the researchers deemed to be relevant and clearly covering the conceptual 280 
scope of metacognitive awareness were selected for further refinement. Half of these 281 
were positively and negatively worded items. Items included: ‘I do not slow down when 282 
I encounter important information about the puzzles’, ‘I know how to modify a strategy 283 
if it is not helping me to solve a puzzle’, and ‘I find myself pausing regularly to check 284 
my comprehension of the information presented in a puzzle’. All items were presented 285 
on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree, unlike the 286 
100-mm bipolar scale used in the MAI. All the items that were negatively worded were 287 
reverse-scored such that the higher the total score, the better the meta-cognitive 288 
awareness of the individual.   289 
 290 
Discriminatory Index - Extreme Group method as described by McIntire and Miller 291 
(2000) was adapted for use here to ensure that each item can discriminate between those 292 
who have high overall scale scores and those who have low overall scale scores. The 293 
highest 25% scorers and lowest 25% total MCAS-DS scorers’ item scores were first 294 
identified. For each of the 40 items, the difference between the proportion of individuals 295 
in each group who scored 4 (Agree) and 5 (Strongly Agree) were calculated. Items that 296 
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differentiated high total scorers from low total scorers (D=0.30) were retained, while 297 
items that did not adequately differentiate high scorers from low scorers were excluded. 298 
By doing so, the scale was reduced to 18 items. These items were therefore most 299 
effective in discriminating the highest scorers from the lowest scorers.  The scale was 300 
further refined and examined using Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA), the results of 301 
which will be reported in the Results section. A 15-item scale was finally derived and 302 
utilised for subsequent explorations.  303 
 304 
In addition to the Likert scale items, eight short additional questions that explored 305 
participants’ performance and experience of the Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices 306 
(SPM) were constructed. These included questions such as whether participants had 307 
previous experience with the SPM, whether they think they can improve their own 308 
performance, and their level of confidence regarding their responses. This last item was 309 
measured using a 7-point Likert scale. One of the questions also required participants 310 
to endorse as many of the listed strategies they used to solve the SPM.  These strategies 311 
were derived from descriptions of the SPM from the test manual and literature 312 
(Prabhakaran et al., 1997). They include, ‘Looking for how 3 characteristics such as 3 313 
geometric shapes or 3 line textures are distributed through a row’ and ‘Verbally repeat 314 
some characteristics of a figure to help solve the puzzles’. Also included on the list of 315 
strategies was one improbable strategy (‘Associating even numbers to shapes and then 316 
perform calculations’). This was included as a mean to verify whether participants 317 
would endorse it either due to a tendency to acquiesce, or perhaps exhibit social 318 
desirability by endorsing as many strategies as possible. 319 
 320 
Marlowe-Crown Social Desirability Scale   321 
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To control for response bias, social desirability was measured via a short 13-item True-322 
False version of the Marlowe-Crown Social Desirability Scale (Reynolds, 1982). 323 
Example item reads: ‘I sometimes feel resentful when I don’t get my way’. This scale 324 
displays acceptable internal reliability of .76, and compares well to the standard version 325 
(Reynolds, 1982). Test-retest reliability was .74 and the scale demonstrated good 326 
concurrent validity of .93 with the standard form (Reynolds, 1982; Zook and Sipps, 327 
1985). High score suggests a tendency to appear more socially desirable and thus more 328 
likely to complete items in order to avoid disapproval of others. 329 
 330 
Metacognitive Awareness Inventory 331 
The Metacognitive Awareness Inventory (Schraw and Dennison, 1994,[MAI]) was 332 
utilised for a sub-group of 16 participants to examine its relationship with the current 333 
domain-specific metacognitive awareness questionnaire. It is postulated that the 2 334 
scales would be different as they measure metacognitive processes at different levels, 335 
and that MAI assesses metacognitive awareness associated with learning, whilst the 336 
MCAS-DS assesses metacognitive awareness specifically related to Raven’s 337 
Progressive Matrices.  MAI contained 52 items using a 100-mm bipolar scale. However, 338 
as it is not central to the current study, the response format of a dichotomous scale was 339 
used instead. 340 
 341 
Locus of Control Scale (Rotter 1966)  342 
Locus of Control Scale consists of 29 forced-choice items which included 6 filler items. 343 
This was administered to only 16 participants due to a technical error made during data 344 
collection process. It measures generalised belief in internal-external control of events 345 
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in life. Higher scores are indictive of the tendency of the individual believing that life 346 
events are contingent on external factors such as luck and environment. 347 
 348 
Education Level 349 
Education level was measured by asking participants to indicate their highest 350 
educational qualification, ranging from 1 (primary school), through to postgraduate 351 
qualifications (5). 352 
 353 
Results 354 
Meta-cognitive Awareness Scale – Domain Specific (MCAS-DS) scale 355 
development 356 
Exploratory Factor Analysis was undertaken to examine the initial 18-item scale which 357 
was derived after the Discriminatory Index method, as described earlier, was applied. 358 
Following Field’s analysis procedure, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) statistics was 359 
examined together with the diagonal element of the anti-image correlation matrix. Two 360 
items (22 and 1) with values below 0.50 in the latter were removed as recommended. 361 
The final KMO value (.61)  is mediocre (Kaiser, 1974). Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity 362 
reached statistical significance indicating that chosen analysis method would be 363 
suitable. Initial analysis with Maximum Likelihood extraction showed seven factors 364 
with eigenvalues above 1, and they each explained a range of the observed variance, 365 
decreasing from 15.54% for the first factor down to 6.48% for the seventh factor. The 366 
scree plot did not show an obvious break which would have enabled a clear decision of 367 
the number of factors to be retained.   368 
 369 
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When the analysis was conducted again with the 16-item scale, 6 factors were extracted, 370 
cumulatively explaining 62.83% of variance. Given that the factors were intercorrelated, 371 
even if only weakly, Direct Oblimin rotation method was used. The Pattern Matrix 372 
showed that there was one factor with only 2 items, one of which also loaded onto 373 
another factor.  Therefore, the lone item (18) was removed.  This resulted in a 5-factor 374 
solution using Kaiser’s criterion, and improved the interpretability of the Pattern Matrix. 375 
This 5-factor solution accounted for 40.91% of the variance after rotation.  The Chi-376 
square goodness-of-fit index, showed this to be a good fit (χ2 (40)= 25.88, p = .96) 377 
although it is acknowledged that this goodness-of-fit index is sensitive to sample size 378 
(Anderson & Gerbing, 1984). Therefore, the final scale consisted of fifteen items and 379 
five factors were retained. Table 1 shows the factor loadings of the final 15-item scale 380 
after rotation. 381 
 382 
The first factor of this 15-item scale explains 9.80% of the variance, and encompasses 383 
two items. It consists of items describing Awareness of Engagement in Self-monitoring 384 
(e.g. ‘I find myself pausing regularly to check my comprehension of the information 385 
presented in a puzzle’. The second factor of three items, explains 10.19% of variance, 386 
and it relates to Awareness of Own Ability (e.g. ‘I know how to modify a strategy if it 387 
is not helping me to solve a puzzle’). The third factor, Awareness of Response Speed, 388 
explains 10.13% of variance and has items including ‘When I am unsure about the 389 
correct answer to solve a matrix, I rarely hesitate’.  The fourth factor explains 5.97% of 390 
the variance, whilst the fifth factor explains 4.82% of the variance. The fourth factor, 391 
Awareness of Alternative Solutions, contain items such as ‘I find myself evaluating 392 
how many possible answers I have narrowed down to determine my progress in solving 393 
a puzzle’. Whilst the final factor, Awareness of Requisite Problem-Solving Resources, 394 
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contains items such as ‘Information about a puzzle that is straightforward will be more 395 
time consuming than information that is complicated’. In terms of the scale reliability, 396 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the full 15-item scale was 0.63.   397 
 398 
To examine the MCAS-DS properties, correlation analysis was also conducted for a 399 
subgroup of 16 participants. The subgroup analysis using a very small sample here is 400 
not ideal and stemmed from a technical error at the point of data collection. No 401 
significant relationship was found between MCAS-DS and the MAI (r = .194, n = 16, 402 
p > .05; Percentile Bootstrap 95% CI [-.361, .689]).  Confidence interval was calculated 403 
using bootstrapping technique. Similarly, no significant correlation was found between 404 
MCAS-DS and Locus of Control (r = -.295, n = 16 p > .05; Percentile Bootstrap 95% 405 
CI [-.714, .172]). It is plausible that the lack of significant correlations here are due to 406 
the small sample size, thus restricting the data range which is problematic when 407 
conducting correlational analysis (Bland and Altman, 2011).  As previously postulated, 408 
there is however no expectation that there should be significant relationship between 409 
scales that measures meta-cognitive processes operating at different levels, nor with 410 
unrelated scales such as Locus of Control. Together, despite the sample size limitation, 411 
it may indicate the discriminant validity of the MCAS-DS.  However, this will need 412 
further exploration in future studies. 413 
 414 
Descriptive statistics for variables 415 
Means, minimum and maximum scores, and standard deviations of other variables in 416 
the study are shown in Table 2. 417 
 418 
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As part of the general exploration of participants’ experience relating to SPM, 419 
participants were presented with a few other SPM test-taking behaviour items and their 420 
responses are summarised in Table 3.  The majority of participants (63.3%) have not 421 
had experience with SPM and thought they could improve their own performance.  In 422 
terms of strategies, the majority of participants (66.3%) said they have used different 423 
strategies to solve different SPM items instead of using the same one. Lastly, the 424 
researchers constructed an improbable strategy and embedded it amongst other 425 
strategies that could be used to solve SPM items, to which, only a minority (30.6%) 426 
endorsed it. 427 
 428 
Confidence and Over-/Under-Confidence 429 
Participants’ confidence in the accuracy of their own SPM answers was significantly 430 
correlated with their SPM performance (r = .420, n = 96, p < .01). Over-/Under-431 
Confidence was derived by subtracting the SPM z-score from the level of confidence 432 
z-score. Therefore, the closer the Over-/Under-Confidence score is to zero, the more 433 
accurate the individual is in rating their own level of confidence that is commensurate 434 
with their performance level. Positive score indicates Over-confidence and negative 435 
score indicates Under-confidence. 436 
 437 
Metacognitive Awareness and SPM 438 
A significant positive correlation was found between Metacognitive Awareness and 439 
SPM standardized scores, r = .295, n = 97, p = .003, such that the higher the MCAS-440 
DS scores, the higher the SPM standardized scores. 441 
 442 
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Metacognitive Awareness, Age, Education Level, Over-/Under-confidence, Social 443 
Desirability and SPM 444 
A standard Enter method multiple regression was conducted to examine the relationship 445 
between Metacognitive Awareness, Age, Education level, Over-/Under-confidence, 446 
Social Desirability and standardized Raven’s SPM. The correlations between the 447 
variables are presented in Table 4. 448 
 449 
Assumption of multicollinearity was not violated as indicated by variance inflation 450 
factor analyses (VIF) indices being less than 2 for all variables (VIF= > 1). No violation 451 
of the normality, linearity and homoscedasticity were found. These were checked by 452 
inspecting the Normal Probability Plot of the Regression Standardised Residual which 453 
showed that the points lie in a relatively straight diagonal line with no major deviations 454 
from normality (See Figure 1). The scatterplot of the standardised residuals did not 455 
show any clear pattern in their distribution (See Figure 2 to Figure 6). There were no 456 
outliers detected from the scatterplot nor from examining the Mahalanobis distances 457 
values where none of the cases exceeds the critical value of 20.52. Durbin-Watson 458 
statistics (2.121) showed that adjacent residuals were uncorrelated, hence independence 459 
of errors can be assumed.  460 
 461 
Together, Metacognitive Awareness, Age, Education Level, Over-/Under-confidence 462 
and Social Desirability as a model, significantly predicted the standardized SPM scores 463 
F(5, 85) = 10.831, p < .001; and explained 38.9% of the variance of standardized SPM. 464 
R2 = .389 (Adjusted R2 = .353).  Cohen’s f2 = .637 indicated that this is a large effect 465 
size. See the plot of standardized predicted values against standardised residuals (Figure 466 
7). 467 
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 468 
Upon closer examination of the individual predictors (Table 5), it was found that two 469 
variables were significantly and uniquely making contribution. They were the Over-470 
/Under-confidence measure, and the metacognitive awareness measure. For the Over-471 
Under-confidence measure (  = -.519, t(85) = -5.977, p < .001), it was negatively 472 
associated with SPM scores. Specifically, the more under-confident the individuals, the 473 
better they performed on SPM. Metacognitive Awareness measure scores ( = .288, 474 
t(85) = 3.340, p = .001) were positively associated with SPM scores such that 475 
individuals with higher meta-cognitive awareness tended to also score higher on SPM. 476 
 477 
Discussion 478 
This study investigated the relationship between metacognitive awareness and 479 
standardized SPM scores that are most often linked to problem-solving and intelligence. 480 
To enable the measurement of metacognitive awareness, a domain-specific, Raven’s 481 
SPM-focussed questionnaire was constructed, and then administered immediately 482 
following the completion of the focal task. As an offline measure, the construction of 483 
the current scale addresses the often-cited problems with online metacognition 484 
measurements which are, the disruption of optimal task performance, and the reactivity 485 
exhibited when eliciting metacognitive information (Double and Birney, 2019). In 486 
addition, there is the issue of metacognitive questionnaires being too generic and not 487 
reflecting the cognition involved in the specific task (Allon et al., 1994). This approach 488 
of constructing a measure based on the task (SPM) used has not yet been adopted in 489 
this field of research and therefore this study presents for the first time, a novel approach 490 
to the investigation of meta-cognitive processes. 491 
 492 
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The first aim of this study was to develop a domain-specific meta-cognitive awareness 493 
questionnaire. A 15-item scale was developed and analysed using Exploratory Factor 494 
Analysis. A five-factor solution emerged; these components are named as ‘Awareness 495 
of Engagement in Self-Monitoring’, ‘Awareness of Own Ability’, ‘Awareness of 496 
Response Speed/Time’, ‘Awareness of Alternative Solutions’, and ‘Awareness of 497 
Requisite Problem-solving Resources’.  498 
 499 
The first factor captured participants’ awareness that they are engaging in the 500 
monitoring their own processing of the test items, such that they know they are pausing 501 
to check their own comprehension. This may be related to the top level cognition in the 502 
proposed 3-level metacognitive system (Narens et al., 1996), where participants are not 503 
only aware but monitor the strategies they are using, in addition to utilising strategies 504 
and engaging in problem-solving.  505 
 506 
The second factor, Awareness of Own Ability, reflects participants’ knowledge and 507 
perhaps confidence that they know how to solve the items by modifying their initial 508 
strategy to replace an unsuccessful one. The emergence of the third factor relating to 509 
response speed or time is unexpected because the SPM was administered without any 510 
time-limit. There may be different explanations for this.  Processing speed has been 511 
often cited as an important component of intelligence (Schubert and Frischkorn, 2020), 512 
and perhaps reflects the implicit theories laypersons have of intelligence (Langfeldt and 513 
Imbof, 2001). Therefore, it may also reflect participants’ implicit theory that the speed 514 
of responding may be important, despite no time-limit was being imposed on them. 515 
After all, many tests require test-takers to complete as many items as possible under a 516 
set time limit. It is also possible that participants are aware that there are a series of 517 
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items that required their attention, hence they self-imposed a limit on the time they 518 
spend on solving each item in order to complete all the items.  519 
 520 
The fourth factor, Awareness of Alternative Solutions, relates to participants showing 521 
their awareness that there may be other seeming possible solutions to the puzzles and 522 
therefore monitoring these will enable them to arrive at the best solution.  As for the 523 
final factor, Awareness of Requisite Problem-Solving Resources, it consists of 524 
participants being aware of their possession of requisite knowledge when solving 525 
problems.  For example, a longer time may need to be allocated to solving puzzles with 526 
complex information. It is perhaps akin to how learners allocate their effort during 527 
learning which is part of metacognitive monitoring judgements (Baars, Wijnia, de 528 
Bruin & Paas, 2020).  529 
 530 
Relating this to the 3-level metacognitive system (Narens et al., 1996) the participants 531 
therefore engage in problem-solving (Object-level, L0) of the SPM, utilising various 532 
strategies to enable them to problem-solve (Mid Meta-level, L1), such as changing 533 
approach to problem-solve, but they are also aware of their own engagement in self-534 
monitoring, their own ability, the response speed or time they utilise, that there may be 535 
alternative solutions, and the necessary ingredients for them to solve the puzzles 536 
(Highest Meta-level, L2).  This 3-level metacognitive system seemed to provide the best 537 
theoretical, a priori fit to the results here. However, it is recognised that this is an open 538 
empirical question as there are other models which describes the different relationships 539 
between the information used for problem-solving and those used for metacognitive 540 
self-evaluation (e.g. Maniscalco and Lau, 2016; Fleming and Daw, 2017).  541 
 542 
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In terms of the psychometric properties of the 15-item Meta-Cognitive Awareness Scale 543 
– Domain Specific (MCAS-DS), Cronbach’s alpha reliability was relatively low (α 544 
= .63 for the full 15-item scale). Ideally, this should be higher and therefore, further 545 
refinement of the scale would be necessary. The correlation between MCAS-DS and 546 
the Metacognitive Awareness Inventory (MAI) is not statistically significant. There 547 
may be a few reasons here – firstly, this may not be surprising given that the former has 548 
been constructed to specifically focus on one task, the SPM, whilst the MAI is typically 549 
used in a generic learning-related context. Secondly, although bootstrapping of the 550 
correlational analysis was undertaken, the restriction in terms of available MAI data for 551 
the whole sample and thus a bigger sample size here remains a limitation for the 552 
analysis, and should be addressed in future studies. Conceptually, the MCAS-DS is 553 
deemed to measure the awareness of strategies participants used, thus operating at the 554 
Meta-Level L2 as described by Nelson (1996) as opposed to MAI that did not specify 555 
the level it measured. No significant relationship was found between MCAS-DS and 556 
Locus of Control, and this is an additional indication of the discriminant validity of the 557 
MCAS-DS. 558 
 559 
Given that this study may be the first and the only exploration of a domain-specific 560 
questionnaire linked closely to the focal task to date, it warrants further examination 561 
and development to improve its psychometric properties. This approach to the 562 
construction of a domain or task-specific task, however, is unique.  It also fits well with 563 
literature that posits the importance of task-specific measures (Thompson, 2000). 564 
  565 
Although some might question the usefulness of such a specific metacognitive 566 
awareness questionnaire, it is worth noting that Raven’s Progressive Matrices, as a 567 
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family of ability tests, are closely aligned to fluid intelligence and reasoning; hence, 568 
further examination may yield new information about fluid intelligence and reasoning. 569 
In addition, the matrices have properties that could lend themselves to segmentation of 570 
cognitive processes—a strength already recognised in the field of cognitive and 571 
neuroimaging studies (Carpenter et al., 1990; Christoff et al., 2001; Prabhakaran et al., 572 
1997; Silberstein et al., 2004; Song, 2005). Chuderski et al. (2020) summarises the 573 
types of methods used to examine the cognitive processes involved in solving the 574 
matrices. They include identification of strategies using eye-tracking technique, and 575 
examining elementary cognitive variables such as working memory capacity.  These 576 
demonstrate the utility and level of interest researchers have in understanding the 577 
matrices. This therefore merits the pursuit of dedicated, domain-specific meta-cognitive 578 
scales to help segment the respective cognitive process that underpin higher-order 579 
thinking, and so advance understandings of fluid intelligence. 580 
 581 
Metacognitive awareness was hypothesised to correlate positively with SPM 582 
standardized scores, and indeed a significant positive correlation was observed. This 583 
agrees with previous research that showed a positive correlational relationship between 584 
metacognition and intelligence (Veenman and Beishuizen, 2004). The strength of the 585 
current metacognitive awareness-intelligence relationship is comparable to that 586 
reported in a recent meta-analytic study (Ohtani and Hisasaka, 2018) even though the 587 
current study utilises a domain-specific metacognitive awareness measure. This should 588 
not diminish the importance of the current measure given that it addresses important 589 
theoretical and measurement issues that will be discussed further later.  590 
 591 
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Previous research showed that higher metacognitive knowledge was displayed more in 592 
gifted children in comparison with children of high-average and low-average 593 
intelligence (Swanson, 1992). Campione and Brown (1978) even attributed differences 594 
in intelligence level to the variations in the efficiency of executive or metacognitive 595 
processes. The current finding also supports the Triarchic Theory of Intelligence 596 
(Sternberg, 1988), which postulates a close relationship between metacognition and 597 
intelligence, even if the exact metacognition-intelligence relationship and direction of 598 
causality is currently unclear. 599 
 600 
Contrary to current findings, Allon et al. (1994) found a non-significant relationship 601 
between metacognition and intelligence. Allon et al speculated that if the problem-602 
solving task that they employed in their study of metacognition has been more closely 603 
related to an intelligence test, then, perhaps a metacognition-intelligence relationship 604 
could have been found. This study did precisely address Allon et al.’s (1994) point that 605 
by using the SPM as a measure of intelligence and as the focal task upon which 606 
participants’ metacognitive awareness was measured. Hence, this novel method may 607 
have contributed to the significant relationship found between metacognitive awareness 608 
and intelligence here. It would appear that similar to others’ finding that reasoning 609 
processes are task- and content-specific, rather than domain-general (Thompson, 2000), 610 
a task-specific scale such as the current MCAS-DS is necessary for the study of 611 
metacognitive awareness during SPM. 612 
 613 
To achieve the second aim of this study to examine the relationship between 614 
metacognitive awareness and other variables with SPM, a multiple regression was 615 
conducted.  Specifically, the hypothesis was that SPM scores would be predicted by 616 
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Metacognitive Awareness, Age, Education Level, Over-/Under-confidence and Social 617 
Desirability. The model containing the chosen variables predicted SPM and explained 618 
38.9% of the SPM variance. Of the variables examined, only Over-/Under-confidence 619 
and Metacognitive Awareness significantly predicted SPM independently. 620 
 621 
Higher Metacognitive Awareness scores are associated with higher SPM scores. This 622 
seemed to indicate that factors such as being aware of one’s own engagement in self-623 
monitoring, own ability and so on, are related to SPM performance.  The more aware 624 
the individuals are of these, the better their performance. Over-/Under-confidence also 625 
significantly predicted SPM such that the more over-confident (positive value) the 626 
participant, the lower their SPM performance. 627 
 628 
The ability to evaluate one’s own performance has previously been studied using an 629 
online metacognition measure of self-rated confidence administered after every item of 630 
SPM.  Those who displayed higher meta-cognitive awareness were found to perform 631 
better than those who did not (Double and Birney, 2017). In this study, rating of self-632 
confidence was elicited offline following the completion of the whole SPM task. It also 633 
showed a similar performance outcome as seen in other studies wherein self-confidence 634 
is positively correlated with SPM scores. This self-confidence was then used to 635 
calculate the Over-/Under-confidence score. 636 
 637 
This Over-/Under-confidence score provided an additional metacognitive measure at 638 
the mid meta-level (L1) of the 3-level metacognitive system.  This measure incorporated 639 
the subjective self-evaluation with the more objective actual performance.  It indexes a 640 
person’s self-rated confidence that is linked to their actual performance. Therefore, it is 641 
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not just about a person’s self-confidence but whether that confidence level is 642 
commensurate with their performance level. According to the results, being able to have 643 
the level of confidence that is commensurate with their performance appeared to be a 644 
factor that is linked to better performance. This is akin to measuring the “accuracy” of 645 
their confidence level instead of having misplaced confidence. 646 
 647 
In this study, individuals who are over-confident with their performance and whose 648 
confidence are not justified by their actual performance showed lower SPM scores. This 649 
fits well with the Dunning-Kruger effect that poor performers seemed to have less 650 
insight, or in this case, less “accuracy” in their assessment of their own thought 651 
processes. Considering both Over-/Under-confidence measure and self-confidence 652 
measure, it appeared that having self-confidence may be good but only if it is 653 
commensurate with their level of task performance. 654 
 655 
At the higher meta-level, L2 where the current MCAS-DS operates, a positive 656 
relationship between metacognitive awareness and SPM was found. This is another 657 
indication that the more aware individuals were of their meta-reasoning processes, the 658 
better their performance on reasoning tasks such as SPM. This agrees with previous 659 
findings of Dunning-Kruger effect in high level reasoning whereby analytic thinkers, 660 
rather than intuitive thinkers, were found to be more aware of their reasoning strengths 661 
and weaknesses (Pennycook et al., 2017). Further research is necessary to explain how 662 
participants’ insight relates to their overestimation (Dunning-Kruger effect) or under-663 
estimation (intellectual humility) of their own performance (Krumrei-Mancuso et al., 664 
2019). The relationship between self-confidence and performance also warrants further 665 
investigation much like other studies conducted in the field of perceptual confidence 666 
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and metacognitive awareness on visual working memory (Samaha et al., 2016). In 667 
addition, there are findings that suggest that there may be sex difference in confidence 668 
and metacognitive monitoring accuracy for ability measures, especially in the spatial 669 
abilities domain.  Although females displayed lower confidence in their monitoring and 670 
assessment of their overall or global performance compared to males, their actual 671 
performance on the task did not differ from those of their male counterparts. What is 672 
interesting is that females, in their trial-by-trial performance monitoring, as opposed to 673 
their global performance monitoring, showed that their own performance monitoring 674 
was accurate. It may be that females utilise strategies that are different from those used 675 
by males when solving spatial problems. They may be also utilising cues differently 676 
(Ariel, Lembeck, Moffat and Hertzog, 2018). Further scrutiny of sex difference in 677 
confidence ratings in future studies using a spatial task such as Raven’s Progressive 678 
Matrices may be helpful. 679 
 680 
In this study, although education level was correlated with Raven’s Progressive 681 
Matrices performance, it did not significantly predict the performance. Age did not 682 
correlate nor predict Raven’s Progressive Matrices performance. These do not agree 683 
with previous findings. The reason for this may be partly due to the relatively smaller 684 
sample size of the current study, and the different age groups examined in this study 685 
and previous studies (Pearman, 2020). Mean age of participants in previous studies was 686 
higher than the mean age of participants in this study (Tucker-Drob et al., 2014; Yuan 687 
et al., 2018). These could be further examined with a sample that has better distribution 688 
of age, and perhaps education level too, given that over half of the participants in the 689 
current study completed high school only.  It is noted that approximately 37% of the 690 
participants have experience with Raven’s Progressive Matrices or similar items and it 691 
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is possible that this might have an influence on their performance and their awareness 692 
of their own Raven’s problem-solving strategy. 693 
 694 
The strength in this study stems from the approach taken to the study of metacognitive 695 
awareness and embedding it within the 3-level metacognitive system.  The construction 696 
of the MCAS-DS, a domain-specific meta-cognitive awareness measure, that is directly 697 
linked to the focal task and yet minimises disruption to task performance by it being an 698 
offline measure, is unique. It addressed issues raised in previous research, including 699 
that reasoning tasks are governed by their own unique parameters (Allon et al., 1994; 700 
Thompson, 2000), and therefore require exploration using their own parameters. SPM, 701 
as an often-used reasoning task which is also used for the study of intelligence, has 702 
therefore its own unique parameters that are best understood using a task-specific scale. 703 
This MCAS-DS minimises disruption to, and impact of, metacognition measure on task 704 
performance, and also minimises reactivity in participants in its design by being an 705 
offline measure (Double and Birney, 2019; Garner and Alexander, 1989; Zakay, 1996). 706 
 707 
There are a number of ways in which this study could be improved. The scale’s 708 
psychometric properties will need further refining. It may involve adding additional 709 
items and improvement in the wording of the items to improve its reliability and 710 
construct validity. The latter will ensure that all aspects relating to the awareness of 711 
their SPM-taking behaviours is captured as comprehensively as possible. Further 712 
validation of the scale using a larger sample, and using it with other meta-cognitive 713 
scales is recommended. A comparison between how well this scale performs against 714 
other scales will be helpful even though the current scale already addresses important 715 
theoretical (Thompson, 2000) and measurements issues (Double and Birney, 2019; 716 
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Garner and Alexander, 1989; Zakay, 1996) not addressed by other known generic 717 
metacognitive scales. The sample utilised in the current study encompasses a broad 718 
range of individuals of different ages and background but it is less than ideal in terms 719 
of sample size. Further validation of the scale using a much larger sample size and using 720 
different sample groups would be necessary. 721 
 722 
Whilst the current results showed that participants who performed better also tended to 723 
show higher metacognitive awareness scores, all the participants were administered the 724 
same task without controlling for task difficulty.  It is possible that lower metacognitive 725 
scores may be attributed to the participant’ “struggle” with completing the Raven’s 726 
Progressive Matrices. Therefore, they were unable to complete the metacognitive scale 727 
well as a result of that, rather than due to their poorer metacognitive awareness.  There 728 
may be steps that can be undertaken to overcome this.  For example, it is possible to 729 
pre-test participants to determine the proportion of participants who can complete each 730 
test items successfully, and then select the items that are deemed to be of a particular 731 
difficulty level for subsequent administration to other participants. This then can be 732 
used to control for task difficulty.  An example of this is found in Ackerman (2014). 733 
This can be examined in future studies.  734 
 735 
There may be other confounding factors that may influence the results here, for example, 736 
social desirability as well as other types of response bias. In the current study, social 737 
desirability, was included in the multiple regression analysis but did not show a 738 
significant relationship to the Raven’s Progressive Matrices scores.  There were also no 739 
significant relationship between social desirability with metacognitive awareness.  740 
Other types of bias, for example, extreme responding or tendency to respond using only 741 
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particular section of the scale are more difficult to control.  However, these response 742 
bias issues can, and should be investigated further (Kreitchmann, Abad, Ponsoda, Nieto,  743 
and Morillo, 2019). 744 
 745 
In addition to the above suggestions of improvement and future exploration, as an 746 
extension of the current study, it may soon be possible to link the present findings to 747 
the findings of brain imaging findings so to further elucidate the relationship between 748 
brain function in metacognitive awareness and intelligence. Currently however, brain 749 
imaging research continues to present divergent results and theories for understanding 750 
the neural basis of metacognition; indeed, one study suggests that metacognitive 751 
processes are underpinned by distinctive neural substrates (Valk et al., 2016), whereas 752 
another study posits the existences of broader task-dependent, domain-specific and 753 
domain-general networks (Rouault et al., 2018); and a third study posits frontoparietal 754 
networks as always being involved in metacognition regardless task or judgement type 755 
(Vaccaro and Fleming, 2018). 756 
 757 
In conclusion, this study uniquely employed the offline recall method with a domain-758 
specific metacognitive awareness measure to assess the relationship between 759 
Metacognitive Awareness and Intelligence, and further examined the role of Social 760 
Desirability and Over-/Under confidence during problem-solving task of Raven’s SPM. 761 
This approach to scale-construction in this field addresses often-cited concerns with 762 
online metacognition measures whilst providing opportunities to examine test-taking 763 
behaviours during Raven’s SPM. There is a need to improve the metacognitive 764 
awareness measure and to seek further opportunity to explore the different meta-level 765 
processes.  The use of a larger sample size and with a different sample to ensure 766 
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replicability of the findings will also be necessary. However, take together this paper 767 
describes an example of a potentially fruitful approach to the construction of future 768 
metacognitive measures.   769 
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Table 1. Rotated Factor Loadings for the MCAS-DS (N=98). 1033 
  Rotated Factor Loadings 























21 I find myself pausing 
regularly to check my 
comprehension of the 
information presented 
in a puzzle. 
1.028 .071 -.147 .115 .023 
6 I do not slow down 
when I encounter 
important information 
about the puzzles. 
.442 -.052 .305 -.081 .003 
28 I know how to modify 
a strategy if it is not 
helping me to solve a 
puzzle. 
.081 .944 .108 -.074 -.144 
11 I can identify the most 
important information 
about the puzzles. 
-.076 .392 .071 -.030 .076 
26 I use my intellectual 
strengths to 
compensate for my 
weaknesses. 
.034 .384 -.076 .089 .146 
9 I do not often check 
my understanding of 
significant information 
about a matrix. 
-.028 .180 .687 .035 -.058 
4 When I am unsure 
about the correct 
answer to solve a 
matrix I rarely 
hesitate. 
.002 -.180 .524 .048 .118 
20 I do not stop and 
review a puzzle when 
I get confused. 
.056 .151 .466 .050 .102 
33 I find myself 
evaluating how many 
possible answers I 
have narrowed down 
to determine my 
progress in solving a 
puzzle. 
-.110 .060 -.057 .647 .017 
  44 
35 I do not ponder for a 
long time over two 
answers that could 
possibly solve the 
puzzle. 
.174 -.228 .114 .562 .034 
16 I think of several ways 
to solve a puzzle and 
choose the best one. 
.111 .141 .163 .314 -.103 
34 Information about a 
puzzle that is simple 
will be easier to 
comprehend than 
information that is 
complicated. 
-.088 .115 -.141 .102 .586 
24 Information about a 
puzzle that is 
straightforward will be 
more time consuming 
than information that 
is complicated. 
.071 -.080 .246 -.247 .575 
39 I am unaware of the 
strategies I use when 
solving puzzles on the 
Raven’s Progressive 
Matrices  
-.151 .078 .131 .117 .432 
29 I do not think that 
some people will have 
more intellectual 
weaknesses than 
others in solving the 
Raven’s Progressive 
Matrices 
.094 -.009 .031 -.049 .322 
 Initial Eigenvalues 2.593 1.972 1.699 1.318 1.109 
 % of variance after 
extraction 
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Table 2. Means, minimum and maximum scores, and standard deviation (SD) of the 1041 
variables. 1042 
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum n 




52.69 5.51 38 67 98 
Age 33.09 16.51 18 79 97 
Education Level 2.68 .94 1 5 97 
Social Desirability  6.20 3.03 0 13 93 
Number of 
strategies reported 
6.62 1.96 1 11 98 
Level of confidence 
in accuracy of own 
answers 
4.69 1.33 1 7 97 
Over-/Under-
Confidence 




33.63 5.24 27 42 16 
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Table 3. Frequencies of responses for items relating to SPM experience 1047 
 Yes (%) No (%) n 
Had previous experience with SPM or SPM-
like task 
36 (36.7) 62 (63.3) 98 
Whether or not own SPM performance could 
have been improved 
65 (66.3) 33 (33.7) 98 
Used the same strategy for all SPM items 25 (25.5) 72 (73.5) 97 
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Table 4. Intercorrelations of SPM, Metacognitive Awareness, Age, Education Level, 1065 
Over-/Under-confidence, and Social Desirability. 1066 












 1 2 3 4 5 




.295** -    
3. Age .016 ns -.102 ns -   
4. Education Level .173* -.108 ns .038 ns -  
5. Over-/Under-
confidence 
-.538** .023 ns -.152 ns -.154 ns - 
6. Social Desirability -.082 ns -.109 ns .247** -.113 ns -.039 ns 
  48 
Table 5. Linear model of predictors of standardized Raven’s SPM, with 95% 1079 
confidence intervals in parentheses. 1080 
Model b SE B β p 
1 (Constant) 64.273 (37.086, 91.460) 13.674 
 
p < .001 
Meta-cognitive 
Awareness  
0.748 (0.303, 1.194) 0.224 .288 p = .001 
Age in years -0.022 (-0.175, 0.132) 0.077 -.025 p = .780 
Education 
Level 
1.817 (-0.820, 4.453) 1.326 .119 p = .174 
Over-/Under-
confidence 
-6.871 (-9.157, -4.585) 1.150 -.519 p < .001 
Social 
Desirability 
-0.243 (-1.076, 0.590) 0.419 -.051 P = .564 
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 1091 
Figure 1. Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardised Residual where the Raven’s  1092 
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 1189 
Figure 7. Scatterplot of standardized predicted values against standardised residuals. 1190 
 1191 
